According to CSIS, Africa has become the world’s most active theatre for Salafi-jihadist terrorism. Unlike the Middle East, where most groups have been degraded by sustained counterterrorism operations, African affiliates of Al Qaeda and the Islamic State have embedded themselves deeply within local conflicts. In doing so, they have transformed into powerful actors capable of exploiting political vacuums, intercommunal grievances, and weak central authority. As they grow in strength and influence, these groups are not only undermining national governments but also threatening the collapse of regional order.

Nowhere is this more evident than in the Sahel and West Africa. Here, the jihadist insurgencies led by Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), Al Qaeda’s branch in the Sahel, and the Islamic State–West Africa Province (ISWAP) have reshaped the political landscape. In countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, these groups have successfully contested state control, governing swathes of rural territory and supplanting formal justice systems with their own. The result is a growing sense of lawlessness and abandonment among local populations, many of whom turn to jihadist groups not out of ideological conviction, but as a means of security and basic governance.

The withdrawal of French forces under Operation Barkhane and the broader decline of international counterterrorism support in the Sahel have only accelerated this collapse. CSIS notes that the erosion of security in West Africa is not merely a local crisis, it is a regional emergency. Terrorist groups now move with relative ease across porous borders, destabilising neighbouring states and threatening to create a corridor of conflict stretching from the Atlantic coast to the Red Sea. These groups do not currently seek to attack Western targets directly, but their ability to overthrow governments or establish autonomous enclaves raises serious concerns about long-term regional stability.

Further south, the situation in Central Africa also paints a grim picture. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), now affiliated with the Islamic State, have become one of the most lethal terrorist organisations on the continent. The group has massacred civilians, attacked churches, and spread terror across the country’s eastern provinces. While it lacks the ambition or capacity to project power internationally, its sustained campaign of violence contributes to the chronic insecurity that prevents effective governance and development in the region.

In East Africa, the report identifies Al Shabaab in Somalia as the most dangerous group on the continent. Unlike its West African counterparts, Al Shabaab is not only a threat to state stability but also retains the intent and capacity to attack foreign targets. The group has proven resilient despite years of military pressure from African Union forces and Somali national troops. As the African Union’s presence in Somalia winds down, there is growing concern that Al Shabaab will fill the vacuum, further weakening the Somali state and potentially reigniting ambitions for a wider regional jihad.

The group’s continued control of territory, ability to levy taxes, and capacity to mount complex attacks against urban centres reveal a highly developed insurgency with quasi-governmental functions. This level of operational sophistication allows Al Shabaab to sustain itself financially and militarily while maintaining a stranglehold on Somalia’s political future. Should the group grow bolder or the central government falter further, the prospect of state collapse or fragmentation looms large.

Meanwhile, in Southern Africa, Islamic State–Mozambique (IS-M) offers a more contained but still dangerous case study. Once in control of strategic towns and energy installations in northern Mozambique, IS-M has been pushed back by a combination of domestic forces, Rwandan troops, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). However, CSIS cautions against complacency. The group remains active and determined, and any faltering of external support could lead to a resurgence, reigniting the insurgency and threatening fragile economic progress in the region.

The implications of these dynamics extend far beyond the immediate zones of conflict. Terrorist activity has already displaced millions, exacerbated humanitarian crises, and weakened the institutional fabric of many African states. In areas where terrorists govern by coercion or default, young people are recruited into militias, cross-border trade is disrupted, and local disputes are militarised. These trends entrench poverty, feed corruption, and inhibit the development of accountable governance.

CSIS’s assessment stops short of recommending large-scale foreign intervention. Instead, it calls for a smarter, more regionally tailored approach to preventing further destabilisation. For East Africa, particularly Somalia, a multidimensional strategy involving diplomacy, security assistance, and economic development is essential to blunt Al Shabaab’s momentum. In West Africa, where the threat is more latent than direct, intelligence-led engagement, regional cooperation, and early-warning mechanisms are emphasised. The goal is not to eradicate terrorism in Africa, which the report acknowledges is unlikely in the near term, but to prevent its most dangerous outcome, the permanent breakdown of state authority.

The most pressing threat from terrorism in Africa is not to the West, but to Africa itself. Left unchecked, the continent faces a future in which extremist groups act as de facto rulers in large ungoverned spaces, driving cycles of violence that will be increasingly difficult to reverse. The United States and its partners may not be able to prevent every attack, but through sustained support, partnership, and vigilance, they can help prevent the collapse of some of Africa’s most vulnerable states. Stability in Africa, the report warns, is no longer a secondary concern, it is central to the security of the continent and the world.

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Botha’s study highlights the growing frustration among local communities, who feel excluded from the economic benefits of resource extraction. While large multinational corporations have established operations in Cabo Delgado, employment opportunities for locals remain limited, and many perceive that only outsiders are profiting from the region’s wealth. This exclusion has created a sense of disenfranchisement, which ASWJ has been able to exploit to recruit new members and justify its attacks. The insurgents, in some areas, have even positioned themselves as alternative governance structures, providing security and distributing looted goods to win local support.

The study further reveals that organised crime plays a significant role in the conflict. Cabo Delgado has long been a hub for illicit smuggling networks that traffic drugs, minerals, and other resources. These criminal enterprises have provided financial lifelines for insurgents, who have capitalised on the region’s established illegal trade routes. While ASWJ’s direct involvement in illegal mining remains unclear, Botha notes that insurgents benefit from taxing miners, controlling transport routes, and engaging with illicit trade networks. This convergence of extremist violence and organised crime presents a complex challenge, making it difficult to isolate the insurgency from the broader web of illicit economic activities in the province.

Security responses from the Mozambican government have been primarily military-focused, with the deployment of national forces, the Rwandan Defence Force (RDF), and the Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM). However, Botha’s findings suggest that these interventions have not been entirely effective in winning local trust. Many communities perceive the security forces as prioritising the protection of corporate interests over the well-being of civilians. Reports of human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings and mistreatment, have further alienated local populations and, in some cases, driven more individuals to sympathise with the insurgents.

The insurgency has also evolved in its tactics. While ASWJ initially focused on violent attacks against security forces and government institutions, recent developments indicate a shift toward increased engagement with local communities. In some instances, insurgents have provided essential services, distributed looted goods, and engaged in religious outreach to gain support. However, violence remains a key strategy, with sporadic attacks against mining companies and foreign workers raising concerns about future threats to economic interests in the region.

Botha concludes that a purely military approach will not resolve the crisis in Cabo Delgado. Addressing the insurgency requires a comprehensive strategy that tackles the root causes of economic marginalisation, governance failures, and community resentment. She emphasises the need for policies that ensure local populations benefit from resource extraction, alongside efforts to combat corruption and improve the conduct of security forces. Without meaningful economic and social reform, the insurgency is likely to persist, evolving alongside the shifting dynamics of organised crime and resource exploitation.

The conflict in Cabo Delgado is not simply about extremist violence; it reflects deeper socio-economic and political fractures. As Botha’s research illustrates, resolving the crisis will require more than military intervention, it demands a long-term commitment to inclusive development, fair economic policies, and governance reforms that restore public trust. Without these measures, the province will remain vulnerable to continued violence and instability, with insurgents and organised criminals alike exploiting its wealth and its people.

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