Entering its headquarters in Pretoria, it is easy to see how the SIU is different from many other government agencies. The modern building is a beehive of energy – staff bustle around with purpose and direction.

The question is why this agency stands out from the rest. New Institute for Security Studies research undertaken in cooperation with the SIU seeks to provide answers.

SIU Head Andy Mothibi tells stories about how he began his career at the South African Revenue Service (SARS). As a young lawyer at SARS, he looked up to leaders like the late Pravin Gordhan, who instilled staff with an ethic of serving a ‘higher purpose.’ Mothibi says this legacy lives on at the SIU.

Leadership is important for the success of all organisations, but it is especially important for anti-corruption agencies. The ‘tone from the top’ must be courageous, motivated, and honest.

Fulfilling statutory requirements, qualifications, and experience is not enough. Leaders must also possess superior human relations skills, resilience and the ability to inspire. Mothibi is evidently a strong leader whose staff are willing to follow him into the difficult terrain of anti-corruption enforcement.

Leadership is important for the success of all organisations, but it is especially important for anti-corruption agencies

The SIU has an organisational culture of excellence, integrity and innovation. Lifelong learning is incentivised, and many staff members pursue advanced degrees part-time.

There are other drivers of the SIU’s success. The unit uses civil law to recover debts owed to the state. This means it only has to prove cases on a balance of probabilities. This is a lower threshold than the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) has to meet in criminal corruption cases, which is ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’ Civil recovery processes have the potential to recover more assets than criminal processes.

The SIU has independence over its finances and human resources. It can make its own decisions about who to hire and how much to pay them, and is therefore successful at attracting talent.

This is another advantage the SIU has over its partners in the fight against corruption, such as the NPA. The latter is relegated to a programme of the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, and subject to its control – a situation that also requires remedy.

Another driver of the SIU’s success is that its investigations are activated only by presidential proclamations. This means the unit cannot threaten presidents or their allies. This may have protected the SIU from political interference in the past. However, as our research shows, this also compromises its independence.

The SIU fills a strategic gap in South Africa’s anti-corruption institutional architecture

The SIU submits requests for a presidential proclamation to the justice department as part of a bureaucratic process of assessing them and forwarding them to the president. This delays the start of investigations and provides opportunities for people to hide the proceeds of corruption and destroy evidence.

One way to improve the SIU’s performance is to eliminate the ‘middleman’ and empower the SIU to send requests for presidential proclamations straight to the presidency.

There are other ways to improve the SIU’s performance. The unit makes recommendations to the government institutions it investigates on remedial action. Its work would be even more effective were these recommendations binding, like those of the Public Protector.

The SIU currently faces a cash crunch linked to the increasing number of investigations it has been authorised to conduct, combined with an ineffective funding model. The SIU bills the state institutions it investigates for the work it has done. Unsurprisingly, many are unwilling to pay. The SIU’s funding model must be changed to allow the unit to keep a percentage of funds recovered, as some anti-corruption agencies in other countries do.

Most importantly, the safety of SIU personnel and whistleblowers is a serious concern. The safety of staff and witnesses should be a non-negotiable imperative of anti-corruption enforcement in a country where fiscal survival depends on reducing corruption, and assassination is often used to resolve disputes.

The SIU fills a strategic gap in South Africa’s anti-corruption institutional architecture. South Africa does not yet have a dedicated anti-corruption prevention agency, even though the United Nations Convention against Corruption provides that it should. With corruption, prevention is better than cure, and over time, the SIU’s work has evolved to cover this terrain.

NACAC recommends that the SIU become South Africa’s new dedicated anti-corruption agency

This essential work, plus the SIU’s reputation for effectiveness, may be why the president’s National Anti-Corruption Advisory Council (NACAC) recommends that the SIU become South Africa’s new dedicated anti-corruption agency.

At the National Anti-Corruption Dialogue on 9–10 December 2024, NACAC Chair Firoz Cachalia proposed a new independent anti-corruption prevention agency: the Office of Public Integrity. NACAC recommends that the new agency be a Chapter 9 institution with similar levels of independence to the Public Protector. It should absorb the SIU with all its current functions, enabling the new agency to start immediately.

As NACAC nears the end of its term in August 2025, this recommendation comes amid increased allegations about corruption in the criminal justice system. We are in a moment when leadership, independence, and building trust in South Africa’s justice institutions matter.

Will President Cyril Ramaphosa seize this moment to fulfil his promises to establish a new anti-corruption agency? South Africa’s long-awaited anti-corruption reform moment could be just around the corner.

This article was republished with permission from ISS Today, the original article can be found here.

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The rollout comes with a significant price tag. The SAPS estimates R14.4 million over five years, although the true cost will be far higher once the infrastructure for data storage and security, maintenance, repairs, officer training and supervisory capacity are factored in.

There are also non-monetary costs, particularly the impact on the right to privacy. BWCs introduce a new layer of surveillance, and the purpose behind their use must be clearly defined from the outset.

If the pilot is intended to assess whether BWCs are suitable for the South African context, the SAPS must first be clear about what problems they are trying to solve and what success would look like.

The past decade’s rapid expansion in BWC use worldwide has generated a lot of research on their impact on a range of outcomes, with widely varying results. The most comprehensive and reliable conclusions come from meta-reviews, which pool together and analyse the results of many studies.

Globally, one of the most common motivations for introducing BWCs has been to reduce police use of force. The theory is that both police officers and members of the public are more likely to behave appropriately when they know they are being recorded. Some studies support this claim, while others show no effect, and the overall evidence has become less conclusive over time.

What matters most is not simply whether officers wear cameras, but when and how they are activated, what training and supervision accompanies their use, and the broader culture within which they operate. In South Africa for example, BWCs are unlikely to make a significant dent in the kinds of incidents that led to the 460 deaths from police action recorded by the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID) in 2024.

These cases often occur in high-stakes, fast-moving environments, where the presence of cameras alone is unlikely to alter behaviour in the moment. That is especially true in the absence of strong command oversight, consistent accountability and a well-established culture of restraint.

Officer safety is also a motivation for police using BWCs. This is particularly relevant in South Africa, where dozens of officers are killed in the line of duty every year. While it is plausible that BWCs could deter aggression and assist in prosecuting offenders, international research has not produced strong evidence to support this claim.

The most substantial evidence in favour of BWCs relates to reducing complaints against police. Whether this is due to improved officer behaviour, fewer frivolous complaints or both, the result is fairly consistent. BWCs could provide objective evidence to help resolve disputes fairly and quickly. They may also reduce the burden of civil claims, potentially saving significant resources.

Even a modest reduction in complaints and misconduct could help contain the over R2 billion in civil claims currently faced by the SAPS. For that reason, the pilot should prioritise deployment in areas with a high concentration of civil claims, where the potential for both accountability gains and cost savings is greatest.

There are other possible benefits. BWCs may strengthen evidence for court proceedings, leading to better case outcomes or shorter trials, and significant savings across the prosecution process. They could also improve post-incident debriefing and training, help identify successes and failures, and ultimately enhance policing practices.

But these benefits require supporting systems. Without adequate capacity for supervision, training and review, BWCs risk becoming just another piece of technology that does little to change behaviour or improve service.

Because of this, the SAPS pilot should be designed to test not only whether BWCs work in theory, but whether police are ready to support them in practice. This includes technical readiness: secure and scalable systems must be in place for storing, protecting and accessing footage.

Data must be reliably backed up, safeguarded under the Protection of Personal Information Act, and governed by clear protocols around retention and access. Mishandled footage could seriously undermine public confidence. At the same time, oversight mechanisms such as IPID must be guaranteed timely and full access when footage is needed for investigations.

International evidence also makes clear that results depend heavily on how cameras are used and managed in different institutional and community contexts. Most BWC research has been conducted in the United States and United Kingdom. South Africa differs significantly in terms of violent crime rates, infrastructure constraints and levels of public trust in the police.

So on the one hand, we should not assume that benefits observed elsewhere will automatically apply here. On the other, new and unexpected advantages may emerge. The pilot should be treated as a chance to generate South African evidence that can inform whether a national rollout is appropriate, and what conditions would be needed for success.

In the end, BWCs are not a shortcut to accountability, nor are they the SAPS’ most urgent reform priority. But given the investment, it is vital that the cameras be used in a way that drives broader improvements in training, supervision and performance, underpinned by a clear institutional commitment to transparency.

With the right planning, support systems and rigorous evaluation mechanisms, this pilot is a rare opportunity to learn what works in our context. It could shape policy and demonstrate leadership in building a more accountable police service.

This article was republished with permission from ISS Africa, the original article can be found here.

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Mchunu has prioritised ensuring greater cooperation on safety in the metro areas. In the past six months, the Cape Town, Ekurhuleni, Johannesburg and eThekwini metros have all signed cooperation agreements with the SAPS. Provincial governments are co-signatories.

For these initiatives to strengthen policing and public safety, they must also tackle endemic corruption by traffic police, who account for over 40% of police personnel in each of these metros (with the SAPS making up the balance).

Police officials reporting to most metropolitan and provincial governments are essentially traffic police. For example, in Gauteng’s three metros (Ekurhuleni, Johannesburg and Tshwane), agencies involved in policing (besides the SAPS) include the metropolitan police departments (one in each metro), Gauteng Traffic Police and Gauteng Traffic Wardens. (‘Gauteng Traffic Wardens’ is the current title of the Crime Prevention Wardens established in 2023.) Apart from the SAPS, the primary function of all these agencies is traffic enforcement.

For cooperation between SAPS and metros to work, they must tackle endemic corruption by traffic police

The metros are a magnet for corruption-oriented traffic police partly because they are where most traffic is concentrated. This includes much of the private-public transport provided by the minibus taxi industry, a principal target for corrupt traffic officers.

National victimisation surveys have repeatedly identified traffic police as the government service most strongly associated with graft (see table). The 2022/23 Stats SA Governance, Public Safety and Justice Survey revealed that more traffic officials than any other government officials asked individuals for bribes in 2019/20 and 2022/23.

Soliciting bribes is deeply embedded in traffic policing in South Africa. Six of the nine national surveys conducted since 2003 that asked about bribery, identified traffic police as the government service most frequently linked to corruption.

Traffic policing corruption reported in South African national victimisation surveys Source: Source: NVCS – National Victims of Crime Survey; GPSJS – Governance, Public Safety and Justice Survey. Surveys from 2010 onwards conducted by Stats SA

Based on current population figures and recent Statistics SA surveys, it may be estimated that roughly 870 000 people in South Africa had bribes solicited from them by traffic police in 2024 (2% of the adult population).

SAPS corruption also features prominently in Stats SA survey results. But the findings show that graft linked to traffic policing is the most brazen form of police corruption in South Africa.

Other forms of corruption that tend to be associated with the SAPS, such as the sale of dockets, or revealing complainants’ identity to gang lords, are more serious as individual incidents. But the cumulative impact of rampant corruption by metro police and other agencies involved in traffic policing, tarnishes the name of all police in the country.

A major study of traffic policing in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s capital Kinshasa found that police revenue from bribes far exceeded that from traffic fines. The study also showed that traffic policing corruption ‘operates as a coordinated system rather than as isolated acts of individual misconduct.’

The level of graft in traffic policing in South Africa suggests that these findings may also be relevant here.

Surveys consistently identify traffic police as the government service most strongly linked with corruption

Agencies involved in investigating police corruption include the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (Hawks), the SAPS and the Independent Police Investigative Directorate. But there is little coordination between them, and none pays sustained attention to corrupt traffic law enforcement. Some metros or traffic police departments have their own integrity units – but there is little evidence of their efficacy.

In recommendations on strengthening the SAPS released in June 2024, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) called for SAPS to establish a ‘well-resourced National Anti-Corruption Unit that is protected from interference.’ It said this unit should address police corruption ‘in all policing agencies’ – which would include traffic police. The ISS also called for dedicated disciplinary measures to expedite cases involving allegations of serious police misconduct.

Mchunu’s efforts to improve cooperation among law enforcement entities in the metropolitan areas are necessary and important. In Gauteng, the three metros account for 84% of community-reported serious crime in the province. In the Western Cape, the City of Cape Town accounts for 64%.

Purposeful steps are needed to restore public respect for the police – including SAPS, metro and other officers

The metros are the engine rooms of South Africa’s economy – so they must be much safer. That requires partnerships not only between law enforcement entities but also between the police, public and private sector. Corruption, including by traffic police, undermines prospects for viable partnerships.

Section 205(1) of the Constitution allows SAPS to be present at metro level, and metro command structures have recently been introduced in line with the district development model. But SAPS remains primarily built around national and provincial levels of command, and struggles to ensure effective metropolitan-level coordination of its own resources.

Related to this, there is currently no effective mechanism for ensuring coordinated use of policing personnel in the metros. In each metropolitan area, a mechanism is needed to coordinate national, provincial and local government police and law enforcement resources. Partnerships are unlikely to work well unless responsibility for overall leadership is clear.

But all the work required to coordinate these resources will be of limited value unless purposeful steps are taken to restore public respect for the police – including SAPS, metro and other officers. This cannot be done without confronting endemic corruption in traffic law enforcement, a problem that is most pronounced in metropolitan areas.

This article was republished with permission from ISS Africa, the original article can be found here.

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The emphasis on police visibility raises an important question: could simply increasing police patrols on the streets play a part in curbing South Africa’s crime crisis?

As a strategy, ramping up the presence of police through patrols is far from new – and can be problematic. It has been a foundational element of visible policing in South Africa for decades. However, the effectiveness of this approach is still up for debate.

At first glance, strengthening police visibility through more patrols seems an obvious and necessary means to reduce crime. A higher police presence should, after all, act as a deterrent while providing the public with a greater sense of safety.

But without a strategic framework guiding these efforts, the results may be underwhelming. Simply adding more officers without a clear focus generally wastes valuable resources and is unlikely to keep crime levels down in the medium term.

To make visible patrols effective, South Africa needs to adopt a focused approach driven by data analysis. This is where evidence-based policing (EBP) comes into play. EBP uses data, research and proven strategies to inform police operations. In addition to relying on traditional policing practices or individual experience or intuition, EBP stresses the need to monitor and test interventions to assess their ability to reduce crime.

EBP studies have shown that some visible patrols – especially in urban areas – are more effective than others. For example, EBP experiments in the United States suggest that increased random patrols have little, if any, impact on crime. In contrast, targeted data-driven patrols are more effective.

A policing intervention in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, found that targeted police foot patrols in specific hot spots saw greater crime reductions compared to control areas. A hotspot operation in Sacramento, California, which involved police carrying out frequent 15-minute foot patrols on high crime streets, showed similar results.

These studies suggest that by using crime data to pinpoint hotspots down to street and block level, police can be deployed to areas where they are most needed, ensuring their resources are used efficiently. However, more research is needed in countries like South Africa, where crime overlaps with acute social, economic and infrastructural challenges.

The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) recently piloted EBP hotspot policing projects in Mitchells Plain, Delft, Khayelitsha, Nyanga and Gugulethu in Cape Town. The trial involved SAPS and Law Enforcement Advancement Plan (LEAP) patrollers from the Western Cape Government and City of Cape Town. The evaluation is ongoing, but tentative findings show positive effects on violent crime levels in the hotspots.

The project offers a glimpse into what a more sophisticated approach to visible policing might look like in South Africa. It is not just about deploying more officers and resources on the streets. Instead, research and evidence must be used to understand where they are needed, how they can be most effective, and what effect their presence is actually having.

While visible patrols can work under these conditions, over-surveillance is a significant concern. Even the best data-driven police strategies will fall short if efforts to improve community relations are neglected. People living and working in areas subjected to constant police surveillance often feel criminalised, and this can foster distrust between residents and law enforcement.

This happened in the United States, where over-policing in minority neighbourhoods in three Michigan cities led to feelings of alienation and resentment. This is relevant in South Africa, where levels of confidence in the police are low. Without attempts to engage and build trust with communities, over-surveillance could backfire, making people feel less secure and resentful towards law enforcement.

South Africa must avoid a one-dimensional approach to visible policing. Instead, a greater police presence must be informed by evidence-based methods to direct resources effectively. This involves using international experience on targeted patrols when designing hotspot operations, and monitoring their impact closely.

Interventions must also foster genuine trust within communities. In Bogota, for example, police combined intensive operations with municipal services projects to improve perceptions of police legitimacy. This approach delivered a 45.6% greater decrease in reported crimes in the hotspots than in the control areas.

Without these vital components, visible patrols may not work and could even backfire. By aligning policing strategies with data-driven insights and actively working with communities, South Africa can achieve a more effective and equitable approach to reducing crime.

Written by the Institute for Security Studies and republished with permission. The original article can be found here.

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