Operation Screen West Africa 2025 (July – October) brought together law enforcement agencies from 12 West African countries to strengthen border security, track persons with links to terrorism and disrupt transnational organized crime networks, Interpol said in a statement. Frontline officers at land, air and sea borders used Interpol Mobile Devices and other systems to access the Organization’s extensive global databases, carrying out a total of 1.7 million real-time checks, up from 1.3 million in 2024.

In all, Operation Screen West Africa 2025 led to nine arrests of individuals suspected of connections with terrorism. It also generated almost 250 “hits” against Interpol databases, including seven linked to Red Notices and nine linked to Blue Notices citing terrorist activities.

Among the operation’s most notable successes were the arrests in Burkina Faso of two individuals wanted by law enforcement authorities, and subject to Blue Notices issued by Côte d’Ivoire, who were involved in terrorist attacks by Al-Qaeda affiliated terrorist group JNIM that killed more than ten security personnel in Côte d’Ivoire in 2020.

Notably, Blue Notices are requests between Interpol member countries to collect additional information about a person’s identity, location or activities, in relation to a criminal investigation. These arrests will allow law enforcement officers to further investigate the deadly attack.

Officers in Burkina Faso also arrested a third individual known to have connections to terrorism, who was also the subject of a Blue Notice issued by Togo in 2024 during FIRST (Facial, Imaging, Recognition, Searching and Tracking), another Interpol operation that took place in West Africa focusing on identifying suspected terrorists and requesting follow-up Blue Notices.

In Mauritania, six individuals were arrested over suspected links to a terrorist attack. Mauritania requested the publication of Blue Notices seeking more information on these suspects.

“These cases highlight how the operational support we offer member countries and our unique specialist tools can make the links that identify suspected terrorists and disrupt their attempts to create fear and endanger communities. We are determined to counter these threats and constantly work with our member countries to strengthen global security,” said Cyril Gout, acting Interpol Executive Director Police Services.

Officers in Ghana were also able to free 21 victims of human trafficking who had been held in Nigeria and exploited in connection with fraudulent schemes.

The operation also included checks at harbours and in territorial waters. Interpol said it alerted participating countries about vessels using deceptive shipping practices, such as identity tampering, so-called dark operations, where ships deliberately switch off their identification systems, and frequent flag changes, or “flag hopping”.

Operational seizures included:

17 caches of weapons and ammunition
Explosives, including dynamite and detonators
136 stolen vehicles
731 kg of cannabis
Counterfeit medicine including fake branded opioid pain relief tablets
Counterfeit currency and fraudulent documents

The proceeds from many of these items may be used to finance terrorism or fund organised crime activities, Interpol highlighted. It said the 12 participating countries in the operation were Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.

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Operation Catalyst was coordinated by Interpol and Afripol between July and September 2025 in Angola, Cameroon, Kenya, Namibia, Nigeria, and South Sudan and aimed to identify and disrupt financial flows and schemes found to have connections to terrorism financing and its support networks.

Of the 83 arrests, 21 were for terrorism-related crimes, 28 were for financial fraud and money laundering, 16 were linked to cyber-enabled scams and a further 18 were related to the illicit use of virtual assets.

Over the two-month operation, authorities across participating countries screened more than 15 000 persons of interest and entities, uncovering around $260 million in both fiat and virtual currencies potentially linked to terrorism-related activities. Approximately $600 000 has already been seized, with additional investigations underway to trace and recover further assets, Interpol said in a statement on 22 October.

Tackling terrorist financing is particularly complex for law enforcement, as it often cuts across diverse criminal activities, including fraud, kidnapping for ransom, illicit trade, online scams, Ponzi schemes and the misuse of virtual assets. These illegal activities can be linked to terrorism financing directly—when terrorist groups receive funds from such schemes—or indirectly, through money laundering or intermediary networks. These connections highlight how different forms of crime are increasingly intertwined, underscoring the need for a united and coordinated response, Interpol explained.

To tackle this multifaceted threat, participating countries shared intelligence on significant targets at the pre-operation phase. This was supplemented by strategic cyber intelligence from Interpol and Afripol with key data from private-sector entities Binance, Moody’s and Uppsala Security.

In one significant case from Angola, 25 individuals of multiple nationalities were detained following investigations into informal value transfer systems that were identified as connected to potential terrorist financing and money laundering. The operation included the inspection of 30 commercial establishments, where police seized approximately $588 000, 100 mobile phones and 40 computers. Sixty bank accounts were also frozen.

In Kenya, a suspected money laundering operation using a virtual asset service provider was identified as having potential links to terrorism financing. The scheme, worth approximately $430 000, involved 12 people, two of whom have so far been arrested. In a separate case in Kenya, two individuals were arrested for the online recruitment of young people from East and North Africa into terrorist groups. The funds used for the recruitment and radicalization were traced through a cryptocurrency trading platform, back to individuals in Tanzania.

In Nigeria, the operation led to the arrest of 11 suspected terrorists, including high-level members of several terrorist groups.

One notable transnational case involved a massive cryptocurrency-based Ponzi scheme, which claimed to be a legitimate online trading platform, affected at least 17 countries around the word, including Cameroon, Kenya, and Nigeria. The scheme accumulated more than 100 000 victims around the world, with an estimated loss to victims of $562 million. The investigations related to Operation Catalyst found that several large-valued wallets were potentially linked to terrorism financing activities. The case is still ongoing, with investigations currently in progress.

As part of Operation Catalyst, a Red Notice was also issued for an individual thought to be behind a sophisticated cryptocurrency scheme which scammed victims of approximately $5 million. The scam redirected funds to multiple addresses and centralized exchange platforms to obscure the trail and convert the assets into fiat currency. Investigators believe the case exhibits several traits consistent with known terrorist financing methodologies.

“Operation Catalyst is the first time financial crime, cybercrime and counter-terrorism units from multiple African countries have joined forces with Interpol and Afripol to target the financing of terrorism. By sharing intelligence, expertise and resources, we can more effectively identify and disrupt the financial flows that support terrorist activities to stay one step ahead of these threats and keep our communities safe,” said Interpol Secretary General Valdecy Urquiza.

“The success of Operation Catalyst lies in the synergy and convergence of efforts among national units combating financial crime, cybercrime, and terrorism. This joint endeavour, dedicated to disrupting the financing of terrorism across the African continent, illustrates how coordinated action between Member States, facilitated by Afripol and Interpol, can effectively address complex and evolving security threats. Such cooperation stands as tangible proof that Africa’s law-enforcement community, when united, offers a decisive and appropriate response in the pursuit of a secure and stable Africa,” said Ambassador Jalel Chelba, Afripol’s Executive Director.

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According to CSIS, Africa has become the world’s most active theatre for Salafi-jihadist terrorism. Unlike the Middle East, where most groups have been degraded by sustained counterterrorism operations, African affiliates of Al Qaeda and the Islamic State have embedded themselves deeply within local conflicts. In doing so, they have transformed into powerful actors capable of exploiting political vacuums, intercommunal grievances, and weak central authority. As they grow in strength and influence, these groups are not only undermining national governments but also threatening the collapse of regional order.

Nowhere is this more evident than in the Sahel and West Africa. Here, the jihadist insurgencies led by Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), Al Qaeda’s branch in the Sahel, and the Islamic State–West Africa Province (ISWAP) have reshaped the political landscape. In countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, these groups have successfully contested state control, governing swathes of rural territory and supplanting formal justice systems with their own. The result is a growing sense of lawlessness and abandonment among local populations, many of whom turn to jihadist groups not out of ideological conviction, but as a means of security and basic governance.

The withdrawal of French forces under Operation Barkhane and the broader decline of international counterterrorism support in the Sahel have only accelerated this collapse. CSIS notes that the erosion of security in West Africa is not merely a local crisis, it is a regional emergency. Terrorist groups now move with relative ease across porous borders, destabilising neighbouring states and threatening to create a corridor of conflict stretching from the Atlantic coast to the Red Sea. These groups do not currently seek to attack Western targets directly, but their ability to overthrow governments or establish autonomous enclaves raises serious concerns about long-term regional stability.

Further south, the situation in Central Africa also paints a grim picture. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), now affiliated with the Islamic State, have become one of the most lethal terrorist organisations on the continent. The group has massacred civilians, attacked churches, and spread terror across the country’s eastern provinces. While it lacks the ambition or capacity to project power internationally, its sustained campaign of violence contributes to the chronic insecurity that prevents effective governance and development in the region.

In East Africa, the report identifies Al Shabaab in Somalia as the most dangerous group on the continent. Unlike its West African counterparts, Al Shabaab is not only a threat to state stability but also retains the intent and capacity to attack foreign targets. The group has proven resilient despite years of military pressure from African Union forces and Somali national troops. As the African Union’s presence in Somalia winds down, there is growing concern that Al Shabaab will fill the vacuum, further weakening the Somali state and potentially reigniting ambitions for a wider regional jihad.

The group’s continued control of territory, ability to levy taxes, and capacity to mount complex attacks against urban centres reveal a highly developed insurgency with quasi-governmental functions. This level of operational sophistication allows Al Shabaab to sustain itself financially and militarily while maintaining a stranglehold on Somalia’s political future. Should the group grow bolder or the central government falter further, the prospect of state collapse or fragmentation looms large.

Meanwhile, in Southern Africa, Islamic State–Mozambique (IS-M) offers a more contained but still dangerous case study. Once in control of strategic towns and energy installations in northern Mozambique, IS-M has been pushed back by a combination of domestic forces, Rwandan troops, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). However, CSIS cautions against complacency. The group remains active and determined, and any faltering of external support could lead to a resurgence, reigniting the insurgency and threatening fragile economic progress in the region.

The implications of these dynamics extend far beyond the immediate zones of conflict. Terrorist activity has already displaced millions, exacerbated humanitarian crises, and weakened the institutional fabric of many African states. In areas where terrorists govern by coercion or default, young people are recruited into militias, cross-border trade is disrupted, and local disputes are militarised. These trends entrench poverty, feed corruption, and inhibit the development of accountable governance.

CSIS’s assessment stops short of recommending large-scale foreign intervention. Instead, it calls for a smarter, more regionally tailored approach to preventing further destabilisation. For East Africa, particularly Somalia, a multidimensional strategy involving diplomacy, security assistance, and economic development is essential to blunt Al Shabaab’s momentum. In West Africa, where the threat is more latent than direct, intelligence-led engagement, regional cooperation, and early-warning mechanisms are emphasised. The goal is not to eradicate terrorism in Africa, which the report acknowledges is unlikely in the near term, but to prevent its most dangerous outcome, the permanent breakdown of state authority.

The most pressing threat from terrorism in Africa is not to the West, but to Africa itself. Left unchecked, the continent faces a future in which extremist groups act as de facto rulers in large ungoverned spaces, driving cycles of violence that will be increasingly difficult to reverse. The United States and its partners may not be able to prevent every attack, but through sustained support, partnership, and vigilance, they can help prevent the collapse of some of Africa’s most vulnerable states. Stability in Africa, the report warns, is no longer a secondary concern, it is central to the security of the continent and the world.

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Botha’s study highlights the growing frustration among local communities, who feel excluded from the economic benefits of resource extraction. While large multinational corporations have established operations in Cabo Delgado, employment opportunities for locals remain limited, and many perceive that only outsiders are profiting from the region’s wealth. This exclusion has created a sense of disenfranchisement, which ASWJ has been able to exploit to recruit new members and justify its attacks. The insurgents, in some areas, have even positioned themselves as alternative governance structures, providing security and distributing looted goods to win local support.

The study further reveals that organised crime plays a significant role in the conflict. Cabo Delgado has long been a hub for illicit smuggling networks that traffic drugs, minerals, and other resources. These criminal enterprises have provided financial lifelines for insurgents, who have capitalised on the region’s established illegal trade routes. While ASWJ’s direct involvement in illegal mining remains unclear, Botha notes that insurgents benefit from taxing miners, controlling transport routes, and engaging with illicit trade networks. This convergence of extremist violence and organised crime presents a complex challenge, making it difficult to isolate the insurgency from the broader web of illicit economic activities in the province.

Security responses from the Mozambican government have been primarily military-focused, with the deployment of national forces, the Rwandan Defence Force (RDF), and the Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM). However, Botha’s findings suggest that these interventions have not been entirely effective in winning local trust. Many communities perceive the security forces as prioritising the protection of corporate interests over the well-being of civilians. Reports of human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings and mistreatment, have further alienated local populations and, in some cases, driven more individuals to sympathise with the insurgents.

The insurgency has also evolved in its tactics. While ASWJ initially focused on violent attacks against security forces and government institutions, recent developments indicate a shift toward increased engagement with local communities. In some instances, insurgents have provided essential services, distributed looted goods, and engaged in religious outreach to gain support. However, violence remains a key strategy, with sporadic attacks against mining companies and foreign workers raising concerns about future threats to economic interests in the region.

Botha concludes that a purely military approach will not resolve the crisis in Cabo Delgado. Addressing the insurgency requires a comprehensive strategy that tackles the root causes of economic marginalisation, governance failures, and community resentment. She emphasises the need for policies that ensure local populations benefit from resource extraction, alongside efforts to combat corruption and improve the conduct of security forces. Without meaningful economic and social reform, the insurgency is likely to persist, evolving alongside the shifting dynamics of organised crime and resource exploitation.

The conflict in Cabo Delgado is not simply about extremist violence; it reflects deeper socio-economic and political fractures. As Botha’s research illustrates, resolving the crisis will require more than military intervention, it demands a long-term commitment to inclusive development, fair economic policies, and governance reforms that restore public trust. Without these measures, the province will remain vulnerable to continued violence and instability, with insurgents and organised criminals alike exploiting its wealth and its people.

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In a parliamentary reply, Minister in the Presidency Khumbudzo Ntshavheni stated the SSA “continues to prioritise comprehensive investigative efforts aimed at determining the veracity of such allegations.” The agency is employing a multi-faceted approach to gather intelligence and evaluate whether South Africa has any direct or indirect links to terrorist entities operating in the region. These efforts are supported by robust collaborations with regional security counterparts, including intelligence agencies from neighbouring countries and international partners.

A key focus of these efforts is to determine if any terrorist groups active in Southern Africa are using South Africa as a logistical base or as a conduit for financing and resources. Where credible links are identified, the SSA is leading joint investigative initiatives with its regional partners, aiming to disrupt and neutralise any identified threats, although Minister Ntshavheni did not give further details or examples of recent successes.

South Africa’s national security strategy, which Minister Ntshavheni promised to release in August, is reliant on regional cooperation and intelligence sharing. The SSA is fully engaged in high-level discussions with other Southern African countries to build a comprehensive picture of regional terrorism dynamics.

Given the transnational nature of terrorism, collaboration is essential. By working closely with neighbouring nations, the SSA intends to enhance its capacity to respond to evolving threats that may not necessarily be confined to South Africa but could affect the broader region.

Many of the concerns surrounding South Africa’s potential role as a terrorist logistical hub stem from allegations raised in media reports and academic research. However, according to the Minister, these assertions “currently lack substantiated evidence.” The SSA has committed to critically evaluating such claims, undertaking systematic investigations to verify the validity of the information, noted the Minister.

This approach seeks to ensures the SSA does not act on speculation, but rather on verified intelligence which accurately reflects the security landscape. This allows the SSA to identify any gaps in intelligence that need to be addressed to improve the country’s overall security framework.

In “fulfilment of its counter intelligence mandate,” the SSA is further taking a “central role in directing” South Africa’s domestic law enforcement response to terrorism and terrorism financing risks. This is done through the implementation of the country’s revised National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (NCTS) and the National Counter the Financing of Terrorism Strategy (NCFTS).

These strategies outline comprehensive frameworks for detecting, investigating, and disrupting terrorist activities within South Africa’s borders. The SSA works closely with other law enforcement agencies, financial institutions, and intelligence bodies to detect and intercept financial flows linked to terrorist organisations, as well as to track and dismantle logistical networks that support these groups.

The revision of these strategies reflects South Africa’s commitment to strengthening its counter-terrorism architecture, ensuring a coordinated and proactive response to terrorism-related threats. It also demonstrates the country’s determination to prevent terrorism financing and to reduce the operational space available to extremist groups within the region.

“This coordinated response is pivotal to strengthening national security and demonstrating the SSA’s and all relevant security cluster department’s unwavering commitment to countering and preventing terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, domestically and regionally,” said the Minister in her reply.

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Speaking at the Border Management Conference and Expo in Pretoria on 13 November, Else said that the real threat of terrorism in South Africa has been an open question for a very long time because no real empirical research has been done into this area. Nevertheless, he has identified three major terror threats in South Africa. The first is right wing extremist groups, but “that situation is more or less under control as those groups have been monitored quite effectively.” The leaders of the National Christian Resistance Movement aka ‘Crusaders’ right-wing organisation have been imprisoned, for example.

The second, and far more serious, challenge is the Islamist extremist threat. In places like Mayfair, Soweto, the East Rand, and Hillbrow, “we picked up a lot of radicalisation taking place especially at madrasas, especially where they are indoctrinating children as young as 11. This is ongoing and sustained. If we don’t deal with this in its early stages, it might get out of hand,” Els warned.

Another major concern is terrorism funding. Over a year ago South Africa received a “wakeup call” when the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) grey listed South Africa because of the country’s less than adequate addressing of the threat of money laundering and terror funding. The country is making efforts to get off the grey list and may come off it next year following another audit.

“Why is South Africa attractive for terror funding? Infrastructure and an advanced banking system make moving funds easy,” Els explained, adding that the high crime rate makes it easy to generate illicit funding; high levels of corruption enable actors to operate with impunity; and terror groups work closely with organised crime. South Africa is investigating some 20 cases of terror funding as part of getting off the grey list, Els said.

South Africa is not alone on the grey list – out of the other countries within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique, Namibia, and Tanzania are also on the grey list.

Growing terrorism in Africa

The rise in Islamist extremist should be seen in the context of increasing terrorism on the continent. According to the Institute for Economics and Peace’s latest Global Terrorism Index, the epicentre of terrorism has moved from the Middle East to Africa, with Burkina Faso taking the top spot in terms of terror activity – Mali is number three on the global list, and Somalia 7, while Nigeria is ranked 8. Multiple terror groups are active in Africa, including Boko Haram, JNIM, Al Shabaab, Islamic State, and ADF. Terrorism deaths are now considerably higher in sub-Saharan Africa than in any other region.

Els said that South Africa is ranked at 89 on the list only because the Index measures attacks, but a lot of funding leaves South Africa for Somalia where it goes to Syria, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Mozambique. Kenya is also a terror finance hotbed.

Tighter border security needed

“Borders are the weak underbelly of the South African system. If we do not mange it, it could become the main conduit,” Els said. Weak and under-resourced borders are “making us more vulnerable to terrorism. Terrorists are exploiting this.” He cited an example of the Lebombo port of entry with Mozambique. Taxi drivers regularly stop before the border post, drop passengers who run through holes in the border fence, and pick up the passengers after they have crossed into Mozambique. “Only the driver is processed. The rest of the passengers walk around the border post.”

Across the border in Mozambique, Els said when the insurgency in Cabo Delgado got going in 2017, recruits from South Africa, Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda flocked there. Mozambique’s weak response means terrorists are still active, with insurgents having a free hand outside the green zones around Pemba, Palma, and Mocimboa da Praia.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique recently withdrew to focus on the DRC, leaving “a huge void” in addressing and countering the threat. Els noted that protests against the government following a disputed election have contributed to the anarchy in Cabo Delgado and a rise in attacks.

“It’s open knowledge there’s a constant flow of money and people from South Africa to Mozambique. I interviewed Cabo Delgado immigration officials and they said they have 21 South Africans fighting there,” Els said, but that’s not all of them.

“Why are borders the weakest link? if we don’t contain and counter, the problem could erupt,” Els told the conference. Outside threats to South Africa include Islamic State recruitment and radicalisation, and terror groups mobilising logistics in South Africa. However, the elephant in the room is corruption and compromised actors that are facilitating porous borders, such as corruption immigration and Home Affairs officials that allow illegal immigrants to move across, or provide false documentation. Lack of effective cooperation with neighbouring countries is also something of a concern when it comes to border security, Els said.

Other concerns he highlighted include under-resourced agencies, weak intelligence, weak crime combating capability (which is reflected in crime statistics), and weak investigation capacity (there is currently aa shortage of 8 000 detectives in South Africa).

“Law enforcement is doing a great job given the circumstances. We are on the back foot due to resources, capacity and skills. Intelligence capacity in South Africa is lacking and the FATF addressed this in their assessment of South Africa.”

Recommendations

Els provided a list of recommendations towards addressing South Africa’s terrorism challenges. “The South African Counter-Terrorism Strategy is classified. We need to develop a more holistic approach towards that,” he said. He also called for regular updates to the strategy as well as the political will to deal with foreign terror groups.

Terror funding and money laundering should be continuously targeted. “Capacity building is essential. Our skills deficit is moving from the state to the private sector.” Other recommendations are more countries implement the SADC Transnational Organised Crime Strategy and SADC Counter-Terrorism Strategy, and South Africa develop a proactive rather than reactive approach to terrorism.

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ISIS cells in South Africa rate a specific mention along with neighbouring Mozambique, Somalia and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) where a three-nation Southern African Development Community (SADC) mission is attempting to curb rebel violence. The cells and countries are said to be “critical links” between far-flung ISIS operations, including those in Africa.

Abubakar Swalleh is a South Africa and Zambia-based ISIS operative, accused of “the physical transfer of funds from South Africa to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).” Additionally, “Swalleh facilitates the movement of ISIS-affiliated individuals from Uganda to South Africa.”

Mohamed Ali Nkalubo, a DRC-based ISIS commander who was previously sanctioned by the US on 8 December 2023, allegedly “relies on Swalleh to move funds and recruit members for ISIS’s DRC affiliate”. Swalleh is believed to have moved to South Africa under the direction of Nkalubo, where he has been involved in robberies and kidnap for ransom.

Zayd Gangat is another South Africa-based alleged “ISIS facilitator and trainer.” ISIS leaders in South Africa have historically relied on robbery, extortion, and kidnap for ransom operations to fund their operations.

The US treasury identified DRC-based Hamidah Nabagala as an intermediary for ISIS financial flows in central Africa. Additionally, Nabagala is accused of funding the October 2021 Kampala bombing, which resulted in the death of one individual, with an additional three left injured. Ugandan authorities had in 2021 arrested an ISIS operative linked to funds from Nabagala. She is believed to have intended to smuggle her three children out of Uganda to an ISIS-affiliate camp in the DRC.

The designations are aimed at the threat ISIS poses to regional security and stability. Treasury has targeted ISIS efforts to expand operations and raise funds in Africa with designations of South Africa-based ISIS operatives, financial facilitators, and their business networks in March and November 2022. Additional designation of a key Somalia-based ISIS finance official was announced in July 2023.

Swalleh, Nabagala, and Gangat have been designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for materially assisting, sponsoring, or having provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, ISIS, a person whose property and interest in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 13224.

Implications associated with the individuals include the blocking and seizure of any property and interests in the United States, and “engaging in certain transactions with the individuals designated today entails risk of secondary sanctions pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended.”

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