In a country where over 85 people are murdered per a day – not to mention thousands of robberies, carjackings, assaults and attempted murder – we should not be toying with our last (and often) only line of defence against lawlessness.

The private security industry employs over 580,000 security guards, with a further 2.5 million registered security guards in reserve. This is in stark contrast to the 179,000 police officers employed by SAPS (as of 2023). While SAPS struggles to maintain a satisfactory presence on our crime-ridden streets, private security guards can spread themselves out to guard businesses, homes, neighbourhoods and more, allowing the drastic manpower shortage of the police to not be felt as much by the population. On top of that, the industry provides employment opportunities that are drastically needed in a country with skyrocketing unemployment.

Private security response times are also far better than that of the police. The South African Intruder Detection Services Association (SAIDSA) considers 15 minutes to be an acceptable response time, but many security firms guarantee a response time of 5 minutes. I know from repeated experience that armed response has appeared within two minutes after being notified of a crime. In stark contrast, the police response time ranges from around fifteen minutes to over an hour.

In response to an ongoing burglary in my neighbourhood, a private security car arrived within forty seconds – police arrived over two hours later. The police station was five minutes away.

Yet, despite the obvious importance of private security and its superiority to the current state of policing, government officials still want to legislate the industry into chaos and dysfunction. A move that will directly enable criminals to wreak havoc.

The amendment contains the following concerning elements:

Allowing a mere accusation to shut down a firm

Under the proposed amendment, security guards will not be allowed to be armed or function effectively if their employer is merely under investigation. No conviction needed. This means that just a mere accusation is needed to render a security company useless.

This gives rivals and criminals an opportunity to destroy the security of a potential target. A criminal cartel could file a false accusation of a company guarding a business they wish to rob. A mafia could force local businesses to hire their services as they accuse legal firms of made-up crimes.

A company should need to be proven of committing a valid crime before it is no longer allowed to function.

Arbitrarily restricting the use of firearms in public spaces

The amendment calls for security guards to not be allowed to be armed in many public spaces, including malls, businesses, churches and even private homes. An exemption can be granted, but without any clear criteria. This grants PSIRA subjective and arbitrary control over where security guards can do their job.

Criminals will take advantage of many firms being denied exemptions and will be able to use their superior access to firearms to commit even more violent crimes. This will also disable the effectiveness of tactical intervention teams, that need to be able to respond quickly to ongoing violent crimes. They cannot wait on a regulator to grant them an exemption while people are being hurt.

If a security company has been allowed to be armed at all, then it shouldn’t matter where they are armed. It is important that we allow security to cover as much ground as possible to guarantee their effectiveness.

Imposing unclear limits on ammunition

The amendment places vague and unclear limits on how much ammunition security guards can possess. Private security operatives need different amounts of ammunition for different scenarios. Tactical intervention teams with semi-automatic rifles need far more than a patroller in a residential neighbourhood.

The amount of ammunition carried by a guard should be completely up to the firm itself, based on experience and industry practice. An ignorant bureaucrat should have no say.

Employer-funded psych tests with unclear standards

The amendment demands that all private security personnel undergo psych tests but does not provide any standards or guidelines. The lack of clarity leaves employers paying out of pocket for something that may not meet PSIRA’s unspoken standards.

A private security firm does not want to employ a madman. It’s within their already present interest to maintain strict standards when it comes to the behaviour and mental well-being of their employees. There is no need for an additional regulation in this regard. And if there is to be a mandated psych test, then PSIRA needs to provide additional guidelines.

Outlawing non-lethal weapons and crowd control equipment

Perhaps most ludicrously, PSIRA wants to ban private security from using non-lethal equipment like rubber bullets, water cannons and tasers (a brand, but which we can presume include any stun guns or non-lethal electric weapons).

Why? Private security fills a valid role in crowd control – stopping mass looting and rioting. The 2021 unrest in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng would have been far worse without private security guarding private business. If you take away non-lethal deterrents, that leaves private security with being forced to use more dangerous alternatives.

PSIRA allows firms to ask for an exemption on a case-by-case basis, but unrest doesn’t really care about regulatory schedules. This amendment functionally renders private security useless at providing non-lethal responses to crime. This either forces them to act more lethally than warranted, or to not act at all.

Attacking firearm tracking devices

The amendment wants private security to track firearms with devices that don’t exist. Perhaps, the government should be more concerned with the thousands of missing police firearms before demanding that the private security industry invent a convenient electronic tracker for guns that can’t just be ripped off by criminals. Functionally, a tracker for firearms does not exist and it is ludicrous to impose such a requirement on private security when police are not expected to abide by the same rules.

Limiting possession of semi-automatic rifles

Preventing private security from using semi-automatic rifles except in very specific circumstances will allow heavily armed criminals to have increasingly greater advantages in firefights. Private security personnel are not fighting petty thieves. They are going head-to-head with assault rifle wielding gangsters. Many of which are well-trained, disciplined and ruthless.

If anything, private security should be equipped with automatic, military-grade weaponry to match their criminal adversaries.

But, PSIRA is more concerned with security firms not “overstepping their role”. A petty defence of the amendment that seems to reveal that the government is feeling threatened by the private sector fulfilling their mandate.

Conclusion

As is to be expected, the private security industry, the Democratic Alliance, security experts and stakeholders oppose the new amendment. We should be looking to improve the effectiveness of private security and law enforcement, not making their jobs harder through ill-thought out regulations and outright bans.

Hopefully, this amendment doesn’t come to pass. Otherwise, criminals will have gained even more breathing room to harm innocent South Africans.

Nicholas Woode-Smith is the managing editor of the Rational Standard, an author and a political analyst. He is a senior associate of the Free Market Foundation and writes in his personal capacity.

The post Opinion: Don’t break private security appeared first on ProtectionWeb.

The violent crime crisis in South Africa is well-documented. It is common to hear people from outside South Africa express astonishment at how we manage to survive in a country with violence levels comparable to active war zones. South Africans have grown accustomed to this reality, while their political leaders only pay lip service to the fight against crime.

We must first determine what type of crime we are addressing. In the simplest definition, a crime is anything deemed unlawful by a statute of a particular jurisdiction. For example, if a law prohibits smoking in a private residence used as a home office; smoking in that space would constitute a crime/offence.

A more robust definition of crime stems from natural law and justice, stating that any action that harms or infringes upon another’s rights is a crime. This definition includes offenses like murder and rape, which do not rely on statutes for recognition as crimes.

It is crucial for citizens to understand this distinction. When politicians claim to be combating crime, which crimes are they targeting? Are they allocating resources to apprehend individuals lacking proper permits or signage for their businesses, or are they focusing on murderers, rapists, and thieves?

Due to non-harmful crimes being included in the statute book, resources are spent on prosecuting individuals whose actions are not harmful but are considered criminal for various reasons. This includes arresting and prosecuting individuals for drug possession and/or drug use and even its commercial activity. No matter how reprehensible you may find it when another person consumes drugs, someone else taking them does not harm you in any way. The action of consuming drugs is not harmful to anyone but the drug user themselves.

Given South Africa’s high rates of violent crime, this focus on non-harmful crimes is troubling. It is imperative to concentrate all criminal justice resources on actions that harm others, such as violent crimes, rather than procedural offenses that do not harm anyone.

This means focusing more on the rape and violent assault epidemic, coupled with a murder rate that would make many across the world afraid to venture outside in South Africa at all, and such rampant theft through crimes like housebreakings.

The most effective approach would be for the legislature to consider repealing many of these laws that criminalize actions without causing harm to others. This would streamline the criminal justice system, allowing it to focus solely on crimes that harm individuals.

As citizens, we must consider what matters most to us. Is it more important to arrest an entrepreneur lacking proper documentation, or should our state’s primary focus be eliminating violent crime in our society? Prosecuting non-harmful actions instead of harmful ones will not create a safer or more prosperous society.

The excessive allocation of resources to non-harmful crimes amidst a severe crisis is why the Free Market Foundation’s Section 12 project suggests decriminalisation as a solution to South Africa’s crime problem. Other solutions to dealing with violent crime include a sounder definition of crimes in South Africa, decentralisation of policing powers as it has been shown to improve accountability, and the ability to respond to local context-specific offenses. Developing the capacity of the criminal justice system by increasing funding to enable it to deal with the mammoth task that is our violent crime problem is also part of the solution.

According to the South African Police Service itself at the Khayelitsha Commission, it does not have enough human resources to service the South African populace. Therefore, the most rational thing to do would be to lessen the avenues under which they will be expending their already limited resources. One can only hope that sense will prevail with the current decision-makers, and they will take seriously our violent crime crisis.

Thus, when the next politician you listen to says they promise to fight crime or they are, ask them which crime? Lest you think the state is protecting you whilst it is criminalizing those who harm no one and by virtue of that, letting those who do harm others, walk free.

The views of the writer are not necessarily the views of ProtectionWeb.

Written by Zakhele Mthembu BA Law LLB (Wits), Policy Officer at the Free Market Foundation.

The post Opinion: South Africa’s priorities should be violent crimes, not procedural ones – FMF appeared first on ProtectionWeb.

The post Draconian PSIRA Amendments Threaten Public Safety appeared first on ProtectionWeb.

This debate resurfaced during a Peace and Security Cluster media briefing in Parliament on 10 April 2025, where ANC MP Dakota Legoete, Chairperson of the Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans, proposed a formal national operation to combat crime, including the SANDF in the strategy. Legoete described the annual loss of more than 29,000 South African lives due to violent crime as tantamount to a war and called for crime to be treated as a war against humanity. He suggested a national proclamation that would enable a multi-agency effort involving the SANDF, SAPS, Border Management Authority (BMA), Home Affairs, and the South African Revenue Service (SARS).

However, defence experts have strongly criticised the proposal. Defence analyst Dean Wingrin called the idea of deploying soldiers for policing “a terrible idea”, warning that the SANDF is already overstretched and under-resourced. “Soldiers are not trained for internal policing,” he argued, “and the Constitution has clearly defined boundaries between the Defence Force and policing.”

Echoing these concerns, African Defence Review Director Darren Olivier stated that militarising crime fighting would ultimately weaken both the SANDF and SAPS. “Study after study shows that using the military in a policing role causes more harm,” he said. “It typically makes them more corrupt, less disciplined, less combat-ready, and more likely to engage in human rights abuses. Some even find it makes crime worse.”

Olivier referred to research by Montesh and Basdeo, which concluded that if SANDF deployments are ever made in support of SAPS, they must be temporary, exceptional, and subject to strict civilian oversight. He warned that repeated military deployments risk reducing the effectiveness of both the army and the police while eroding public trust. “The answer to a failing SAPS is to reform, fix, and improve it, not patch it temporarily with the military.”

Instead, myself and Olivier suggest SAPS and Cabinet consider establishing a gendarmerie; a militarised police force trained to bridge the gap between policing and security enforcement. Such a force, staffed from SAPS ranks and undergoing special training administered by SANDF, could be far more effective in handling violent criminal groups, safeguarding national infrastructure, and delivering tactical expertise.

While SAPS is overwhelmed, public discourse has drifted towards framing crime as a conflict requiring military intervention. It is not the military’s job to enforce the law, and South Africa already has a painful history where the defence force was used domestically by the former government. The decision post-1994 was for this never to be the case again, except in national emergencies like COVID or the July 2021 unrest.

SANDF is not going to be the answer to the fight against crime. It is not a war, but a complex situation that requires a different approach.

What Is a Gendarmerie?

A gendarmerie is a unique institution that sits at the intersection of civilian policing and military organisation. Historically associated with European models of state control and order, particularly in France and Italy, the gendarmerie is characterised by its dual role. Members of a gendarmerie undergo military style training but serve as law enforcement officers. Their operational focus often spans rural and semi-urban areas, border control, and public order management, as well as more complex duties such as counterterrorism and international peacekeeping.

Unlike conventional police services, which are typically under the control of interior or home affairs ministries, gendarmeries usually fall under the umbrella of defence ministries, although some operate with joint oversight. Their military training enables them to maintain discipline and cohesion in the face of disorder, while their policing function gives them a unique capacity to engage with civilians on matters of law and safety.

Portugal: The National Republican Guard (GNR)

One of the most well-established examples of a gendarmerie is Portugal’s National Republican Guard (Guarda Nacional Republicana, or GNR). Established in the early 20th century, the GNR is a uniformed security force under the command of the Ministry of Internal Administration during peacetime, but in times of national disasters or war, reverts to the Ministry of National Defence. It comprises more than 22,000 personnel and is responsible for law enforcement across most of Portugal’s rural and suburban areas, as well as specific national functions such as customs enforcement, highway patrol, and environmental protection.

What sets the GNR apart is its ability to respond rapidly to both civil disturbances and natural disasters, often working in tandem with civil defence and emergency services. Moreover, the GNR has played a significant role in international peacekeeping missions, particularly under the umbrella of the United Nations and the European Union. Its structured, disciplined nature and broad mandate have made it one of the most respected law enforcement entities in Europe.

Cameroon: The National Gendarmerie

Cameroon provides an example of a gendarmerie adapted to an African context, where regional instability and rural security gaps are critical issues. The Cameroonian Gendarmerie operates alongside the national police but focuses primarily on rural and frontier areas where state presence is often minimal. It is a paramilitary force operating under the Ministry of Defence, and its primary tasks include maintaining public order, protecting citizens and property, and supporting other security services in criminal investigations.

Given Cameroon’s diverse and sometimes volatile regions, particularly the Anglophone areas affected by secessionist conflict, the gendarmerie plays a key role in balancing military discipline with public safety. Unlike the military, it is trained to engage with civilians in a policing capacity, making it more adaptable to internal security threats that do not rise to the level of conventional warfare.

Brazil: The Military Police

Brazil’s Military Police (Polícia Militar), which operates at the state level, serves as another instructive example. While technically not a national gendarmerie, the Military Police forces in Brazil perform very similar roles. Each State within Brazil has its own dedicated unit, which are charged with preserving public order and supporting civilian police in crime prevention. Although the name might imply a military combat role, the focus is overwhelmingly domestic.

These forces are often deployed in large cities with significant gang violence, such as Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. They receive military-style training, wear military-style uniforms, and operate within a strict chain of command, yet their responsibilities include routine policing activities such as patrols, traffic enforcement, and crowd control.

However, Brazil’s model has not been without criticism. Accusations of excessive force and human rights abuses have occasionally plagued the Military Police, particularly in poor urban areas. Still, their visibility, deterrent effect, and ability to operate in dangerous environments have contributed to their continued use in areas where civilian police would otherwise be overwhelmed.

Why the SANDF Cannot Be Used to Combat Crime

Calls for the SANDF to assist in fighting crime have gained traction whenever the SAPS appears to be overwhelmed. However, military forces are not intended for domestic policing, and their involvement can lead to significant complications.

The first and most critical issue is training. Soldiers are trained to neutralise threats, not to investigate crimes or apprehend suspects with the intent of preserving their civil rights. This results in a fundamental misalignment of purpose: while police are trained to de-escalate and protect, soldiers are trained to engage and dominate. The risk of excessive force, human rights violations, and negative public perceptions increases significantly when the military is used for law enforcement duties. Looking at SANDF’s domestic deployment during the COVID-19 pandemic, we saw several incidents of excessive force, and unlawful detentions of citizens. Although, SANDF did play a significant role in enforcing lockdown restrictions.

Additionally, the SANDF suffers from its own internal problems, including a lack of funding, outdated equipment, aging personnel and low morale. Prolonged domestic deployments would further strain its already limited resources. Furthermore, the SANDF is prohibited by South Africa’s Defence Act from conducting crime investigations, which limits its practical usefulness in any comprehensive crime-fighting operation. Soldiers may be able to patrol and provide presence, but they cannot legally detain, interrogate, or prosecute suspects.

Legal frameworks place additional strict limits on how and when the SANDF can be deployed internally. Such decisions require presidential authorisation and are generally meant for short-term interventions during national emergencies. Using the SANDF as a long-term substitute for policing would be not only legally questionable but also a misuse of military resources.

Why South Africa Would Benefit from a Gendarmerie

A South African gendarmerie would bridge the gap between the civilian-oriented SAPS and the militarised SANDF, offering a versatile, disciplined force trained specifically for law enforcement in high-risk or under-policed areas. It could be deployed strategically to rural communities, townships plagued by gang violence, and border zones where illicit smuggling and trafficking are rife. A gendarmerie would additionally be better suited for the fight against illegal mining, an issue which falls outside of SAPS’ current capabilities.

Unlike soldiers, gendarmes would be trained in both community policing and military tactics, allowing for nuanced engagement with civilians while retaining the ability to respond forcefully when needed. This would prove invaluable in places like the Cape Flats, where criminal networks are deeply embedded and ordinary police officers may be ill-equipped or too fearful to intervene.

The presence of a gendarmerie could also ease pressure on the SAPS by taking over duties such as rural patrols, border enforcement, and rapid response operations. Meanwhile, their military structure and discipline would allow them to integrate with SANDF units in times of national crisis or external threat.

Importantly, a South African gendarmerie would not be intended to replace the police or the army. Rather, it would function as an intermediary force with a clear legal and operational framework, helping to restore public trust in the state’s ability to maintain order.

Further, we must note that this idea is not new and has already been discussed in parliament, under the proposed “Mzansi Home Guard”, but it is crucial that this not be used as a means to address unemployment, which has been a reason mentioned in several such discussions.

Why a Gendarmerie Should Be an Extension of SAPS, Not SANDF

There is a strong argument that a South African gendarmerie should be created as an extension of the South African Police Service (SAPS) rather than the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), particularly when considering budget allocations, operational focus, and institutional relevance.

Firstly, SAPS already commands a significantly larger portion of the national budget than the SANDF, with the 2025/26 budget set at R120 billion. This indicates both government prioritisation and a practical financial base from which a new law enforcement branch could be structured. Leveraging SAPS’s budget means the gendarmerie could be established, staffed, and equipped without undermining national defence spending, which is already under severe strain.

Secondly, SAPS is fundamentally oriented toward civilian policing. A gendarmerie embedded within the SAPS structure would be more closely aligned with constitutional policing principles, including crime prevention, investigation, community engagement, and human rights protection. This is vital in a democratic society with a painful legacy of militarised policing. Situating the gendarmerie within SAPS ensures it retains a civilian law enforcement ethos, even while applying military discipline and capabilities where necessary.

Thirdly, integrating the gendarmerie into SAPS would ensure smoother co-ordination and operational synergy. It would allow for shared resources, information systems, forensic services, and command protocols. This avoids the jurisdictional friction and operational silos that could emerge from housing the gendarmerie within the SANDF, an institution with an entirely different chain of command, purpose, and legal framework.

While the gendarmerie would still benefit from military-style training and equipment, its core mission, supporting civilian policing, especially in high-risk or rural areas, aligns more naturally with the SAPS mandate. Rather than acting as a parallel force, it would serve as a specialised tactical division under the same strategic umbrella, ensuring accountability, transparency, and efficiency.

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In fact, recent insights from Datacentrix partner, Check Point revealed that manufacturing emerged as the most impacted by cyberattacks in the third quarter of 2024, with the sector experiencing 30 percent of all reported ransomware attacks globally over the period.

Another concerning statistic was the fact that – at a regional level – Africa bore the brunt of cyber threats over the timespan, with local organisations facing an average of 3,370 attacks per week – an alarming 90 percent increase from the previous year.

Cybercriminals are exploiting vulnerabilities within manufacturing supply chains, targeting not only the manufacturers themselves, but also suppliers, logistics providers and even critical infrastructure. This underscores the urgent need for robust, proactive cybersecurity measures within this sector.

Attacks in manufacturing can originate from many sources, including energy suppliers, logistics providers and shop floor equipment. Methods could include:

• Ransomware: Disrupting supplier operations and production schedules, leading to delays and financial losses.
• Phishing: Extracting sensitive information such as login credentials or financial data, which could be used to disrupt operations or steal intellectual property.
• Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks: Overwhelming IT infrastructure and causing reputational damage.
• Malware infiltration: Introducing compromised components or software into the supply chain, potentially disrupting operations or compromising safety.
• Industrial espionage: Targeting manufacturing processes or intellectual property for competitive advantage or resale on the black market.

Building a secure framework for manufacturing

To address these challenges, global criteria such as the International Electrotechnical Commission’s (IEC) 62443 standards and the International Organization for Standardization’s (ISO) 27001 standard for information security management systems (ISMS)have been developed. These frameworks promote comprehensive cybersecurity practices across the manufacturing value chain, encompassing development, production and distribution.

ISO 27001 helps organisations identify and address risks holistically, integrating people, policies and technology into their security strategies. The IEC 62443 series, tailored for operational technology (OT), specifies security requirements suited to industrial automation and control systems, which differ from traditional IT environments.

Proactive cybersecurity measures

To strengthen cybersecurity and comply with the related standards, South African manufacturing organisations should begin with a comprehensive risk assessment to pinpoint vulnerabilities. Datacentrix recommends adopting advanced cybersecurity technologies for both OT and IT environments, alongside regular workforce training, including non-IT employees, on security best practices.

It’s also possible to perform offline cyber audits for new equipment, where shop floor equipment can be scanned at staging or pre-production planning and certified as virus, malware and configuration risk free at that time and place. Furthermore, PLC code protection offers advanced PLC versioning, code management, code backup and function block level deployment services. This removes IP from engineering workstations and puts code in secure locations that are easily backed up, restored and documented for compliance and audits.

Securing manufacturing’s future

Manufacturing plays a vital role in driving economic growth and innovation. To remain resilient against cyber threats, organisations within this industry must adopt a proactive and collaborative approach to cybersecurity. As a hybrid ICT systems integrator and managed services provider, Datacentrix is committed to equipping manufacturing businesses with the tools and expertise needed to strengthen their supply chains and safeguard their operations.

The post Securing Africa’s manufacturing sector against cybercrime appeared first on ProtectionWeb.

In 2021, the Constitutional Court ordered parliament to make changes to the law so that it balances the right of authorities to intercept suspected criminal communication with the right to privacy. The Constitutional Court confirmed an earlier declaration by the high court that RICA is unconstitutional, to the extent that it fails to provide adequate safeguards to protect the rights as envisaged in the Bill of Rights, such as the right to privacy, as buttressed by the rights of access to courts, freedom of expression and the media, and legal privilege.

For example, in most cases subjects of surveillance must learn that they were under surveillance when the operation is complete.

The sixth parliament proposed amendments to protect citizens, but the president is concerned they are not robust enough to pass constitutional muster and has asked the seventh parliament to further remedy these deficiencies.

But RICA, a complex piece of legislation which covers criminal law, SIM card regulation, communications law and privacy rights, requires an entire overhaul above and beyond just the surveillance aspects, in order to bring it up to date.

The Department of Justice received multiple submissions on updating the bill in 2023.

SIM cards registration is currently governed by RICA and the act requires consumers to register their SIM cards, used in mobile phones and for financial transactions, by linking them to their name and identity number.

But in reality, many SIM cards are sold pre RICA’ed by the distributors, who use a loophole in the current law to bypass the legal requirements with ease. This makes transferring money with a phone and communication possibly anonymously,

A key challenge in this context is Section 40 of RICA, which allows registered SIM holders, who are designated customers, to transfer their SIM cards to other people. While this provision lets, for instance, a spouse or parent register a SIM card on behalf of their partner or child, it also enables large SIM distributors—technically telecom customers themselves—to buy SIM cards in bulk, register them, and resell them to end-users, thus devaluing the RICA provisions.

Often, third-party distributors, use their designation as customers to register SIM cards but misregister these SIM cards with generic company names or incorrect ID numbers, while doing so in bulk.

Legally, the responsibility to update the information lies with the consumer, yet this step is often overlooked by end-users, resulting in tens of millions of SIM cards being incorrectly registered. This leaves telecoms firms, government agencies and departments struggling to identify who actually holds each SIM card.

Estimates suggest that of the 100 million prepaid SIM cards distributed annually, the majority are incorrectly registered, complicating efforts to trace individuals responsible for specific financial transactions or suspect communications.

Several potential reforms could strengthen SIM security. One approach is to introduce tamper-proof packaging, which would make it harder for third-party distributors to pre-register SIM cards under false IDs or generic corporate names. This packaging could protect each SIM card’s unique identifying numbers, helping prevent bulk registrations and possible cloning of cards.

Another possible reform would hold distributors and telecom providers more accountable for ensuring consumer information accuracy, rather than placing the burden solely on end-users.

Finally, linking SIM card registrations to Home Affairs’ ID verification system could greatly improve security. While bank cards are connected to verified ID numbers, many SIM cards are currently registered to number strings that mimic the 13-digit length of ID numbers, made up random numbers but aren’t verified as authentic. Integrating Home Affairs’ database could help ensure that SIM cards are registered to legitimate, verified users, significantly reducing the risk of misuse.

The validation process could be performed over time, with a grace period allowed for customer details to be synced with a home affairs database.

As mobile phones and SIMs are increasingly used in financial services to apply for loans, buy airtime, purchase insurance, and transfer money to bank accounts or across borders, there needs to be better security around SIM cards.

Just as banks adhere to strict know-your-customer (KYC) legislation, mobile firms should implement stricter regulations to ensure proper identification of SIM card users who access financial services.

Written by Farhad Khan, Telecommunications Consultant.

The post Strengthening RICA: A necessary overhaul for privacy and security appeared first on ProtectionWeb.

The report argue that terrorism persists as a global challenge, asserting that “no country is insulated from terrorism”. In South Africa, this threat is underscored by instances such as the 2004 arrests of individuals with alleged links to al-Qaeda and the 2022 U.S. Embassy alert warning of potential attacks in Sandton, and the Islamic insurgency present in Northern Mozambique. These examples illustrate South Africa’s vulnerability as both a potential target and a logistical hub for extremist activities. However, despite the recognised threat, the private security industry in South Africa plays a limited supporting role in counterterrorism, primarily supporting state institutions rather than taking a leading position.

“Although the private security industry is part of the chain to counter any terrorist threat, its plays only a supporting role. In most countries, including South Africa, private security actors are not trained to counter terrorism.”

One of the central themes of the report is the significant gap in the training of private security personnel to handle counterterrorism scenarios. The findings reveal that while private security officers are often the first responders to incidents, their current training programs focus primarily on conventional crimes such as theft or vandalism. As a result, they lack the skills and knowledge needed to effectively identify, prevent, and respond to terrorist threats, with security officers themselves becoming victims of terror attacks.

A key need identified by PSiRA in the report, is the need for a comprehensive overhaul of training programs to include counterterrorism-specific content, intended to enable private security officers to play a more proactive role in safeguarding critical infrastructure and public spaces.

Collaboration between private security and state agencies emerges as another pivotal focus according to PSiRA. The South African Police Service (SAPS), State Security Agency (SSA), and South African National Defence Force (SANDF) are identified as key the players in the country’s counterterrorism strategy. However, the report points out the integration of the private security sector with these state agencies is limited. By fostering stronger partnerships and facilitating intelligence sharing, PSiRA believes the private security industry could significantly enhance its contribution to national security efforts.

The report further explores global practices, particularly the United States’ response to the 9/11 attacks, which catalysed a transformation in the role of private security in national security frameworks. In the U.S., private security companies have been integrated into public safety initiatives, reflecting the value of public-private partnerships in counterterrorism. Similarly, European nations have leveraged advanced technologies such as CCTV surveillance to bolster counterterrorism efforts. The report suggests that South Africa could adopt similar measures to bridge the gaps in its current counterterrorism strategy.

While highlighting the private security industry’s potential, PSiRA additionally emphasises the challenges facing the industry, such as limited access to resources and intelligence, regulatory deficiencies, and the tension between commercial interests and national security objectives. PSiRA argues that without addressing these obstacles, the industry’s role in counterterrorism will remain limited.

The recommendations provided are both practical and aspirational. The report suggests PSiRA take the lead in developing specialised terrorism and counterterrorism training programs tailored to South Africa’s unique needs. “The current training of security grades does not deal specifically with terrorism or counterterrorism as a standalone subject,” notes the report.

It further advocates for regular inspections of security service providers to maintain industry integrity and prevent the infiltration of illegitimate entities, something which is viewed as “imperitive.” Further, inspections must include an assessment of firearm inventories, as the industry was recently slammed for it’s high rates of lost firearms.

These measures, combined with enhanced collaboration with stakeholders such as the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI) and the SSA, are presented as a crucial step which “enhances the effectiveness counterterrorism efforts.”

The report underscores the industry’s untapped potential while offering actionable solutions to address its current limitations. By emphasising training, regulation, and collaboration, the report aims to provide a roadmap for South Africa to strengthen its counterterrorism efforts and build resilience against an ever-evolving threat.

The post Fighting a Common Enemy: The Role of Private Security in Counterterrorism appeared first on ProtectionWeb.

Prosecutorial independence is more than an abstract legal concept – it is fundamental to the integrity of a fair justice system. Without it, prosecutorial decisions can be swayed by political or personal interests, turning the law into a tool for the powerful. When this happens, corruption flourishes and public trust wanes, leading to widespread lawlessness – conditions all too familiar in South Africa.

Globally, prosecutorial independence is a widely recognised standard. The United Nations’ Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors (1990) and the International Association of Prosecutors’ Standards of Professional Responsibility (1999) both stress that prosecutors must be free from political influence to serve justice effectively.

The Jakarta Statement on Principles for Anti-Corruption Agencies and the accompanying Colombo Commentary highlight the importance of financial autonomy for bodies like the NPA. Without control over their budgets and personnel decisions, these institutions are vulnerable to manipulation and control by external forces.

South Africa’s recent history is a powerful reminder of the dangers posed by a compromised prosecutorial system. The state capture era exposed the devastating consequences of executive interference in prosecutorial decisions. As key government institutions were undermined, the NPA struggled to hold those responsible for corruption to account, and to prosecute crime generally.

The importance of prosecutorial independence is most obvious in the fight against graft. Political or ‘grand’ corruption, affects entire institutions and societies, crippling governance and economic wellbeing. When unchecked, corruption siphons off resources meant to improve public services that are vital for development like healthcare, education and essential infrastructure.

South Africa’s Constitution and the NPA’s founding legislation dictate that the prosecuting authority must exercise its functions ‘without fear, favour or prejudice.’ These protections should shield the NPA from interference, but political meddling has repeatedly undermined its ability to function impartially.

Attempts to prevent the prosecution of high-profile figures such as former police commissioner Jackie Selebi and former president Jacob Zuma were ultimately thwarted by an independent judiciary and civil society efforts. However, the state capture period showed that these victories were far from sufficient. The Selebi matter led to the dismissal of then National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP) Vusi Pikoli in 2009, and Zuma’s corruption trial still isn’t underway.

Despite constitutional and legislative protections, the NPA’s relationship with the executive – specifically its financial and administrative dependence – has left it exposed to interference.

The NPA’s funding arrangement is a crucial factor undermining its independence. Rather than receiving its budget directly from Parliament, the NPA relies on the justice department, with the department’s director-general acting as the accounting officer for the NPA’s budget. This creates a structural weakness, as the NPA’s financial wellbeing depends on another government entity.

The justice department’s director-general also controls many of the NPA’s human resources decisions, including key appointments, promotions and creating essential posts. While some powers have been delegated to the NPA, these can be unilaterally revoked, compromising the prosecutorial authority’s operational independence.

This setup contradicts international standards. Both the Jakarta Principles and the Colombo Commentary emphasise the need for financial and operational autonomy in prosecutorial bodies.

Another major obstacle is the executive’s power over key NPA appointments. The president appoints the NDPP, deputy national directors and provincial heads. The justice minister has the final say over appointing hundreds of Deputy Directors of Public Prosecutions – positions that wield significant authority. The justice minister can also veto the NPA’s requests for external expertise, such as forensic accountants, making it hard for the NPA to nimbly pursue complex cases.

At best, this system creates bureaucratic bottlenecks and uncertainty for the NPA’s leadership. At worst, it gives the executive undue power to obstruct or undermine prosecutorial efforts, particularly when investigations threaten political elites. Either way, the NPA’s ability to function independently is seriously compromised.

Unbridled prosecutorial independence is not a cure-all. As a public institution, the NPA must balance independence with accountability. Prosecutors should not be free from lawful oversight or immune to checks on their conduct. The NPA has made significant strides in this regard, launching an Office for Ethics and Accountability to promote integrity and good governance.

The NPA regularly briefs Parliament and civil society on its performance and use of public funds. Moreover, the justice minister has statutory authority to exercise ‘final responsibility’ over the NPA, albeit not regarding decisions to prosecute or not to prosecute, which are made by the national and provincial directors of prosecutions.

Since 2002, the Office of the Auditor-General has called for the NPA’s financial independence. In his 2011 budget speech, then justice minister Jeff Radebe announced planned legislation to ‘delink’ the NPA from the justice department. For 15 years, numerous bills on strengthening the NPA’s operational independence have been drafted, but none have reached Parliament.

Following the Zondo state capture commission’s 2022 recommendations, President Cyril Ramaphosa pledged to introduce reforms that would enhance transparency in the appointment of the NDPP and address the NPA’s financial and administrative independence. Yet, in November 2023, the Portfolio Committee on Justice and Correctional Services expressed frustration over the lack of progress, urging the justice minister to introduce legislation by January 2025.

The commitments have been made. The president, justice ministry and Parliament all recognise the need to strengthen the NPA’s independence. The Zondo Commission underscores the critical importance of an independent prosecuting authority in preventing future state capture.

It is time for action. South Africa’s new government has the opportunity to do what previous administrations could not – secure the NPA’s financial and operational independence, free from executive control. The future of the justice system and the country’s democracy depends on it.

Written by Martin Schönteich, ISS Consultant and former prosecutor.

Republished with permission from ISS Africa. The original article can be found here.

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The Road Freight Association (RFA) has repeatedly noted the security conditions, as well as interrupted logistics operations, to the various authorities – who have done admirable things above and beyond their daily requirements to address the symptoms (or consequences) of what is happening across the border.

It is very clear that, without the road freight route to the Port of Maputo – through Lebombo, that many South African mining companies face a very bleak future. Our own ports and rail systems have failed us (which is a shame) and the only alternative left to many industries was to make use of the Port of Maputo.

This has now been effectively cut off by the political unrest and continuing protests.

Is this not the time that our President steps in to bring about a peaceful resolution to what is happening in Mozambique? We have a Government of National Unity – which has many warts and tribulations – but is the most probable answer to progress.

We need a Statesman to explain to Mozambique that our country is suffering – and that there needs to be a resolve to agree on the way forward – and whilst that is happening, the corridor to the Port of Maputo needs to be secured. At all costs and by any means.

In the meantime, businesses across the SADC region are looking at bleak prospects in the interim. If you cannot get your goods to your customer (exported through the Port of Mozambique), then there is no revenue, no funding and no sustainable resources to continue in the business.

Our drivers, our trucks, our customers’ cargo, the business image of thousands of African businesses are all threatened day after day. Drivers are beaten (and they have nothing to do with the political landscape in Mozambique), trucks are looted, burnt, roads to the Port of Maputo blockaded and the very Port itself placed under siege.

In the past week there has been an inevitable and slow progression towards the reality that ravaged Mozambique in the early 1970s – a destructive civil war that left the country in ruins with a desperate population hanging on to life. Starvation, disease and land mines haunted every citizen every day.

Do we want to return to that? NO. However, without the intervention of a Statesman (or Woman), this scenario will become ever more true (violence erupts with outright war between various factions and the whole country becomes unstable).

This means any form of product or commodity and passengers/tourism will be halted into and through the country.

The severe disruption of all trade logistics (air, rail, road and sea) will come to a halt and that means huge financial repercussions for both countries (and the greater SADC): loss of revenue in terms of duties and income tax, VAT, company tax, as well as loss of income for businesses (large and small).

The RFA estimates that the full closure / suspension of Port of Maputo operations and the ceasing of any road freight logistics within Mozambique costs around R10 million a day (total cost to SA economy only). Direct losses to freight logistics is around R6mil (includes damage to / loss of vehicles, injury / loss of drivers, looting of loads, inability to retrieve vehicles / disruptions of exports / imports / loss of business due to consignment loads not being fulfilled / loss of fleet capacity to perform linked or other load agreements, loss of revenue for operations / extra security deployments.

The remaining R4 million a day is lost in other sectors including servicing, manufacturing, tourism, retail, mining and agriculture (some of which have more reliance of road freight transport than others).

That means less jobs, higher unemployment, hunger, and all those other “small” things that go hand-in-hand with a collapsing economy. One business at a time – so an economy collapses, and we have seen enough of that in Africa already.

The RFA calls on those who have the connections, the status, the ability to intervene to play the role of statesman. This is about Mozambique, South Africa and the SADC region.

Written by Gavin Kelly, CEO of the Road Freight Association (RFA).

The post Our Country needs the voice of reason and wisdom to resolve the Mozambican tragedy – RFA appeared first on ProtectionWeb.

Instead of allocating additional funds to strengthen various elements of the criminal justice system, the MTBPS skirts around essential short-term strategies and long-term procurement reforms, and lacks concrete targets and enforcement measures.

OUTA is concerned about the dilution of direct anti-corruption efforts in this year’s budget. This is evident in the R174 million reduction to the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) budget for salaries, against the backdrop of a R221 million (45%) increase in remuneration for Members of Parliament and a substantial additional R3.5 billion allocation for South Africa’s military involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). “We are also concerned that the police have had R1.5 billion cut from salaries, mainly from administration, but also from visible policing and detectives,” OUTA said.

These budget amendments starkly contradict the principles of a Government of National Unity (GNU), founded on shared sacrifice and commitment to the public good. At a time when public trust hinges on responsible fiscal management and a clear dedication to combating corruption, prioritising significant pay increases for MPs appears disconnected from the pressing needs of South Africans.

OUTA believes that substantial increases in the budgets for key elements of the criminal justice system—such as the NPA, Special Investigating Unit (SIU), SARS administration, and the Public Protector—are long overdue. “We believe that a lack of attention to these areas, combined with a clear oversight strategy and corresponding structure with systems, will lead to an ongoing failure to address the accountability and oversight gaps that plague many government departments.”

“While we support the move toward Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), particularly Build Operate and Transfer (BOT) programmes, we have witnessed significant corruption and profit gouging in such agreements due to insufficient oversight and accountability.” OUTA warns that billions will be wasted through overpriced infrastructure tenders and poor workmanship which has become the norm in government infrastructure procurement programmes for far too long.

While the government’s National Anti-Corruption Strategy has been in development over the past four years, little is evident in transparent, measurable timelines and funding allocations for anti-corruption enforcement to curb corruption, fraud and criminality, which gives rise to billions of rand lost to the state each year. Without a proactive approach to implement concrete anti-corruption measures, fiscal stability will remain elusive, and South Africa risks further economic decline at the expense of its citizens’ welfare.

Adding to our concerns is the additional R5 billion allocated to Sanral, ostensibly for the Gauteng Freeway Improvement Project (GFIP) debt relief. However, this general allocation lacks transparency, raising questions about whether these funds will be used for targeted debt relief or merely perpetuate inefficiencies within this state-owned enterprise, OUTA said.

While OUTA welcomes Treasury’s plans to address debt-laden and mismanaged municipalities – somewhat focussed on Eskom’s municipal debt relief programmes – the acknowledgement that “many of our municipalities face serious governance, planning and financial management challenges”, is of little consequence if government continues to turn a blind eye to the lack of consequences and accountability for errant municipal management.

OUTA welcomes government’s intention to increase investment in bulk water, sanitation infrastructure and efficient water-management strategies, whilst also implementing a new water-pricing strategy. We note this comes on the back of a reduction of R225 million from the Department of Water and Sanitation Department’s vote, particularly the infrastructure grant, and can only read government’s intentions to tackle the water management crisis through their planned PPPs and BOT programmes. Should this be the case, OUTA believes these plans need to be done in conjunction with a revised strategy for the future management and control of wastewater treatment plants within local government, along with stringent oversight and procurement transparency processes.

OUTA remains steadfast in its commitment to protecting taxpayer resources and securing South Africa’s future. “We urge the government to prioritise fiscal responsibility and implement meaningful anti-corruption measures to restore public trust and ensure that all South Africans benefit from their contributions,” the organisation said.

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