South Africa is no stranger to the persistent challenges of high crime rates, under-resourced police services, and deep-seated socio-economic inequality. These issues have long tested the limits of conventional policing. In recent years, public frustration over the South African Police Service’s (SAPS) inability to control violent crime has led to repeated calls for the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) to be deployed to assist with crime prevention in hotspots such as the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. While the SANDF has, at times, provided temporary support, this reliance on a traditional military force for civilian law enforcement raises numerous ethical, legal, and practical concerns.
This debate resurfaced during a Peace and Security Cluster media briefing in Parliament on 10 April 2025, where ANC MP Dakota Legoete, Chairperson of the Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans, proposed a formal national operation to combat crime, including the SANDF in the strategy. Legoete described the annual loss of more than 29,000 South African lives due to violent crime as tantamount to a war and called for crime to be treated as a war against humanity. He suggested a national proclamation that would enable a multi-agency effort involving the SANDF, SAPS, Border Management Authority (BMA), Home Affairs, and the South African Revenue Service (SARS).
However, defence experts have strongly criticised the proposal. Defence analyst Dean Wingrin called the idea of deploying soldiers for policing “a terrible idea”, warning that the SANDF is already overstretched and under-resourced. “Soldiers are not trained for internal policing,” he argued, “and the Constitution has clearly defined boundaries between the Defence Force and policing.”
Echoing these concerns, African Defence Review Director Darren Olivier stated that militarising crime fighting would ultimately weaken both the SANDF and SAPS. “Study after study shows that using the military in a policing role causes more harm,” he said. “It typically makes them more corrupt, less disciplined, less combat-ready, and more likely to engage in human rights abuses. Some even find it makes crime worse.”
Olivier referred to research by Montesh and Basdeo, which concluded that if SANDF deployments are ever made in support of SAPS, they must be temporary, exceptional, and subject to strict civilian oversight. He warned that repeated military deployments risk reducing the effectiveness of both the army and the police while eroding public trust. “The answer to a failing SAPS is to reform, fix, and improve it, not patch it temporarily with the military.”
Instead, myself and Olivier suggest SAPS and Cabinet consider establishing a gendarmerie; a militarised police force trained to bridge the gap between policing and security enforcement. Such a force, staffed from SAPS ranks and undergoing special training administered by SANDF, could be far more effective in handling violent criminal groups, safeguarding national infrastructure, and delivering tactical expertise.
While SAPS is overwhelmed, public discourse has drifted towards framing crime as a conflict requiring military intervention. It is not the military’s job to enforce the law, and South Africa already has a painful history where the defence force was used domestically by the former government. The decision post-1994 was for this never to be the case again, except in national emergencies like COVID or the July 2021 unrest.
SANDF is not going to be the answer to the fight against crime. It is not a war, but a complex situation that requires a different approach.
What Is a Gendarmerie?
A gendarmerie is a unique institution that sits at the intersection of civilian policing and military organisation. Historically associated with European models of state control and order, particularly in France and Italy, the gendarmerie is characterised by its dual role. Members of a gendarmerie undergo military style training but serve as law enforcement officers. Their operational focus often spans rural and semi-urban areas, border control, and public order management, as well as more complex duties such as counterterrorism and international peacekeeping.
Unlike conventional police services, which are typically under the control of interior or home affairs ministries, gendarmeries usually fall under the umbrella of defence ministries, although some operate with joint oversight. Their military training enables them to maintain discipline and cohesion in the face of disorder, while their policing function gives them a unique capacity to engage with civilians on matters of law and safety.
Portugal: The National Republican Guard (GNR)
One of the most well-established examples of a gendarmerie is Portugal’s National Republican Guard (Guarda Nacional Republicana, or GNR). Established in the early 20th century, the GNR is a uniformed security force under the command of the Ministry of Internal Administration during peacetime, but in times of national disasters or war, reverts to the Ministry of National Defence. It comprises more than 22,000 personnel and is responsible for law enforcement across most of Portugal’s rural and suburban areas, as well as specific national functions such as customs enforcement, highway patrol, and environmental protection.
What sets the GNR apart is its ability to respond rapidly to both civil disturbances and natural disasters, often working in tandem with civil defence and emergency services. Moreover, the GNR has played a significant role in international peacekeeping missions, particularly under the umbrella of the United Nations and the European Union. Its structured, disciplined nature and broad mandate have made it one of the most respected law enforcement entities in Europe.
Cameroon: The National Gendarmerie
Cameroon provides an example of a gendarmerie adapted to an African context, where regional instability and rural security gaps are critical issues. The Cameroonian Gendarmerie operates alongside the national police but focuses primarily on rural and frontier areas where state presence is often minimal. It is a paramilitary force operating under the Ministry of Defence, and its primary tasks include maintaining public order, protecting citizens and property, and supporting other security services in criminal investigations.
Given Cameroon’s diverse and sometimes volatile regions, particularly the Anglophone areas affected by secessionist conflict, the gendarmerie plays a key role in balancing military discipline with public safety. Unlike the military, it is trained to engage with civilians in a policing capacity, making it more adaptable to internal security threats that do not rise to the level of conventional warfare.
Brazil: The Military Police
Brazil’s Military Police (Polícia Militar), which operates at the state level, serves as another instructive example. While technically not a national gendarmerie, the Military Police forces in Brazil perform very similar roles. Each State within Brazil has its own dedicated unit, which are charged with preserving public order and supporting civilian police in crime prevention. Although the name might imply a military combat role, the focus is overwhelmingly domestic.
These forces are often deployed in large cities with significant gang violence, such as Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. They receive military-style training, wear military-style uniforms, and operate within a strict chain of command, yet their responsibilities include routine policing activities such as patrols, traffic enforcement, and crowd control.
However, Brazil’s model has not been without criticism. Accusations of excessive force and human rights abuses have occasionally plagued the Military Police, particularly in poor urban areas. Still, their visibility, deterrent effect, and ability to operate in dangerous environments have contributed to their continued use in areas where civilian police would otherwise be overwhelmed.
Why the SANDF Cannot Be Used to Combat Crime
Calls for the SANDF to assist in fighting crime have gained traction whenever the SAPS appears to be overwhelmed. However, military forces are not intended for domestic policing, and their involvement can lead to significant complications.
The first and most critical issue is training. Soldiers are trained to neutralise threats, not to investigate crimes or apprehend suspects with the intent of preserving their civil rights. This results in a fundamental misalignment of purpose: while police are trained to de-escalate and protect, soldiers are trained to engage and dominate. The risk of excessive force, human rights violations, and negative public perceptions increases significantly when the military is used for law enforcement duties. Looking at SANDF’s domestic deployment during the COVID-19 pandemic, we saw several incidents of excessive force, and unlawful detentions of citizens. Although, SANDF did play a significant role in enforcing lockdown restrictions.
Additionally, the SANDF suffers from its own internal problems, including a lack of funding, outdated equipment, aging personnel and low morale. Prolonged domestic deployments would further strain its already limited resources. Furthermore, the SANDF is prohibited by South Africa’s Defence Act from conducting crime investigations, which limits its practical usefulness in any comprehensive crime-fighting operation. Soldiers may be able to patrol and provide presence, but they cannot legally detain, interrogate, or prosecute suspects.
Legal frameworks place additional strict limits on how and when the SANDF can be deployed internally. Such decisions require presidential authorisation and are generally meant for short-term interventions during national emergencies. Using the SANDF as a long-term substitute for policing would be not only legally questionable but also a misuse of military resources.
Why South Africa Would Benefit from a Gendarmerie
A South African gendarmerie would bridge the gap between the civilian-oriented SAPS and the militarised SANDF, offering a versatile, disciplined force trained specifically for law enforcement in high-risk or under-policed areas. It could be deployed strategically to rural communities, townships plagued by gang violence, and border zones where illicit smuggling and trafficking are rife. A gendarmerie would additionally be better suited for the fight against illegal mining, an issue which falls outside of SAPS’ current capabilities.
Unlike soldiers, gendarmes would be trained in both community policing and military tactics, allowing for nuanced engagement with civilians while retaining the ability to respond forcefully when needed. This would prove invaluable in places like the Cape Flats, where criminal networks are deeply embedded and ordinary police officers may be ill-equipped or too fearful to intervene.
The presence of a gendarmerie could also ease pressure on the SAPS by taking over duties such as rural patrols, border enforcement, and rapid response operations. Meanwhile, their military structure and discipline would allow them to integrate with SANDF units in times of national crisis or external threat.
Importantly, a South African gendarmerie would not be intended to replace the police or the army. Rather, it would function as an intermediary force with a clear legal and operational framework, helping to restore public trust in the state’s ability to maintain order.
Further, we must note that this idea is not new and has already been discussed in parliament, under the proposed “Mzansi Home Guard”, but it is crucial that this not be used as a means to address unemployment, which has been a reason mentioned in several such discussions.
Why a Gendarmerie Should Be an Extension of SAPS, Not SANDF
There is a strong argument that a South African gendarmerie should be created as an extension of the South African Police Service (SAPS) rather than the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), particularly when considering budget allocations, operational focus, and institutional relevance.
Firstly, SAPS already commands a significantly larger portion of the national budget than the SANDF, with the 2025/26 budget set at R120 billion. This indicates both government prioritisation and a practical financial base from which a new law enforcement branch could be structured. Leveraging SAPS’s budget means the gendarmerie could be established, staffed, and equipped without undermining national defence spending, which is already under severe strain.
Secondly, SAPS is fundamentally oriented toward civilian policing. A gendarmerie embedded within the SAPS structure would be more closely aligned with constitutional policing principles, including crime prevention, investigation, community engagement, and human rights protection. This is vital in a democratic society with a painful legacy of militarised policing. Situating the gendarmerie within SAPS ensures it retains a civilian law enforcement ethos, even while applying military discipline and capabilities where necessary.
Thirdly, integrating the gendarmerie into SAPS would ensure smoother co-ordination and operational synergy. It would allow for shared resources, information systems, forensic services, and command protocols. This avoids the jurisdictional friction and operational silos that could emerge from housing the gendarmerie within the SANDF, an institution with an entirely different chain of command, purpose, and legal framework.
While the gendarmerie would still benefit from military-style training and equipment, its core mission, supporting civilian policing, especially in high-risk or rural areas, aligns more naturally with the SAPS mandate. Rather than acting as a parallel force, it would serve as a specialised tactical division under the same strategic umbrella, ensuring accountability, transparency, and efficiency.
