What is South Africa’s post-election coup risk should the ruling ANC lose or be forced to share power after the May 29 polls?
Zero to negligible.
But the risk of a rebellion by rogue supporters of a heavily-factionalised ANC disgruntled by any major power loss is potentially considerable – as is the risk of security agency departments undermining non-ANC ministers post-election, say analysts and security force insiders.
Whilst the risk of an outright coup is regarded as zero, a far higher risk is angry supporters of the now-ruling party seeking to undermine any new government through mass action, strikes and protests, say experts.
It’s a volatile situation and uncharted territory, say observers.
How South Africa’s security forces, themselves highly factionalised, react to any possible ANC power loss – whether an outright loss or security departments managed by unstable coalition partners – is increasingly debated by security analysts, experts and commentators.
A central issue is if security/intelligence agencies and their leadership will submit to political leaders from different political parties, and if such political leaders can manage a transition period insightfully and sensitively.
Therefore if the actual coup risk by police, SA National Defence Force, the State Security Agency (SSA) and others within government’s NatJoints structure is indeed non-existent, other centrifugal forces are at play.
No coup – except in apartheid Bantustans – has ever taken place in a unitary South Africa.
But will the long-standing – pre-dating even apartheid – tradition of obedience to legal civilian authority hold, or will a chain of command culture staffed mostly by ANC cadres for 30 years undermine constitutionality to cover up decades of capture, corruption and mismanagement?
Security forces could just stand still – as with the July 2021 riots – and do nothing whilst disgruntled masses, possibly feeling disenfranchised by election loss, take to the streets.
Former chief of the SA Police Service, General George Fivaz, and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) have a focused and informed insight.
Fivaz says inherent coalition instability is the real danger, with potential unrest and security force resistance mitigated by an ANC still expected to be the premier political party after May 29, with real stability only possible with a government of national unity.
But he does concede in any choice between chain of command or the Constitution, security forces will choose the former.
Yet SA’s unstable socio-economic make-up creates a volatile climate irresponsible politicians can exploit if election results are not acceptable, says Willie Els, a senior analyst and programme manager at the Pretoria-based Institute of Security Studies.
“Both the Police and military are under-staffed, under-funded and not efficiently trained to deal with such challenges.
“The question is, will such forces submit to and follow political leaders from different political parties?”
Along with the ANC itself, all South African security and intelligence agencies are known to be highly-factionalised and politicised, raising the possibility of both inter and intra-agency confrontation.
Fivaz believes the risk of a traditional coup is zero and any isolated upsurge in post-election violence can be handled by the security forces.
“Yes, members of the security forces abuse their power every day, but I really believe that the possibility of a coup in South Africa is next to zero, and that the security forces are capable of dealing with whatever upheavals might emerge from election results,” said Fivaz.
Regarding non-ANC ministers and politicians who might take over security departments in possible coalitions, this can be handled effectively as was done in South Africa’s most recent power-loss situation, the advent of democracy following the April 1994 elections.
Security forces have shown indications that they have learned the lesson of the politically-sparked 2021 mass unrest, Fivaz adds.